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Incentive constraints are constraints that are optimization problems themselves. If
these problems are non convex then the first order approach fails. We propose an al-
ternative solution method where we use the value function as an additional constraint.
This ensures that all solutions are incentive compatible. To get the value function we
use a function interpolator like sparse grids. We demonstrate our approach by solving
two examples from the literature were it was shown that the first order approach fails.
Keywords: incentive constraints, first order approach, parametric optimization, value
function approach.
JEL codes: C63, D80, D82.
1 Introduction
Incentive constraints are an important part of economic modelling. Whenever we encounter a
situation where one party cannot observe the other’s action, we need an incentive constraint to
model the resulting interaction, encompassing optimal taxation, manager remuneration and
mechanism design. We therefore need methods to deal with incentive constraints.
The general idea to handle these constraints, which are optimization problems themselves,
is to replace them with their first order conditions. However it is well known that if the lower
level is non-convex then the true solution might not even be amongst the stationary points of
the first order approach (Mirrlees 1999). Even if the lower problem is convex the optimization
problem resulting from the first order approach is difficult to deal with because the standard
constraint qualifications fail at every feasible point (Ye and Zhu 1995).
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Researchers have addressed this in multiple ways. First we can find conditions under which
the lower level is a convex optimization problem, see Rogerson (1985) or recently Chade and
Swinkels (2020). However, the trade-off is that either the assumptions are strict or that they
do not work for a numerical treatment.
Second is using the first-order conditions and doing a post verification like in Abraham
and Pavoni (2008). But this leaves us without an option if the verification fails. Furthermore
since we know that the true solution might not even be a stationary point, we therefore only
can certify feasibility and not optimality.
Lastly we can look for alternatives to the classical first-order approach. We showed in
Renner and Schmedders (2015) that if we assume that the agent’s problem is a rational
function in his variables then we can use techniques from real algebraic geometry to solve the
resulting bilevel optimization problem. There are two drawbacks to this approach. First, we
need the rational function assumption which is not satisfied for many popular models. Second,
the size of the problem goes up exponentially in the number of agent’s decision variables.
In this paper we propose to augment the first order approach by adding the constraint
that the agent’s payoff has to be at least the value of his value function. This is called the
value function approach in the mathematical programming literature and was first proposed
by Outrata (1990). All optimal solutions of the resulting problem will therefore be incentive
compatible.
An obvious problem is that we usually do not know the agent’s value function and in general
there is no closed form description of the value function. But if we regard the principal’s
choices as fixed then the agent’s optimization problem is easy to solve. Therefore we will use
an approximation of the agent’s value function computed by solving the agent’s problem at
fixed set of points. The domain of the approximation will be the choices of the principal, e.g.
if the principal has two variables to influence the agent then the agent’s value function needs
to be approximated over a two dimensional domain. Thus the complexity of the resulting
problem is mostly independent of the number of choices for the agent but instead depends on
the number of parameters.
The complexity of functional approximation depends on the dimension of the domain
and suffers from the curse of dimensionality. Fortunately there are advances in function
approximation that mitigate the curse and allow us to approximate several problems that
were previously untracktable. If the domain of approximation can be mapped to a square then
sparse grids (Smolyak 1963; Zenger 1991) can be used effectively to approximate even high
dimensional functions, as in Brumm and Scheidegger (2017). If the domain of approximation
is non square then we can use grid free methods from machine learning like Gaussian processes
or neural networks (Murphy and Bach 2012).
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We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on the two classical examples in the
literature. We solve the original counter example from Mirrlees (1999) and the example from
Araujo and Moreira (2001).
2 Value function approach for static principal agent
problems




s.t. G(x, a) ≥ 0, H(x, a) = 0




where x ∈ Rnp , a ∈ Rna , Γ(x) = {aˆ | g(x, aˆ) ≥ 0, h(x, aˆ) = 0} and F,G,H, f, g, h are twice
continuously differentiable functions.
The main issue is the incentive compatibility constraint
a ∈ arg max
aˆ∈Γ(x)
f(x, aˆ) (2)
which tells us that if the principal wants to induce the agent to take action a, she has to take
the agents preferences into account.




s.t. G(x, a) ≥ 0, H(x, a) = 0
∇aˆL(x, aˆ, λg, λh) = 0,
g(x, aˆ) ≥ 0, h(x, aˆ) = 0,
(λg)Tg(x, aˆ) = 0, λg ≥ 0
(3)








i hi(x, aˆ) is the Lagrangian of the agent’s
problem.
However, Dempe and Dutta (2012) show that even if the agent’s problem is a convex
optimization problem, there are two potential problems. If Slater’s constraint qualification
fails then global solutions to the reformulation do not necessarily correspond to global solutions
of the principal agent problem. Further even if Slater holds then local solutions of the first
order approach are not necessarily local solutions of the original problem.
More importantly if the agent’s problem is none convex then Mirrlees (1999) showed that
it is possible that the optimal solution to (1) is not amongst the stationary points of (3). The
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agent’s problem becomes non-convex if we assume that he has a von Neumann Morgenstern
utility where the probabilities depend on his own actions.
Therefore we desire alternative reformulations that allow us to solve problems where the
reformulation (3) fails. If we assume that f(x, a) attains its maximum on Γ(x) for all (x, a)









s.t. f(x, a) ≥ ϕ(x)
G(x, a) ≥ 0, H(x, a) = 0
g(x, a) ≥ 0, f(x, a) = 0
(5)
It is immediate that (5) is equivalent to (1).
Ye and Zhu (2010) propose to combine the value function (5) with the first order approach




s.t. f(x, a) ≥ ϕ(x)
G(x, a) ≥ 0, H(x, a) = 0
∇aˆL(x, aˆ, λg, λh) = 0,
g(x, aˆ) ≥ 0, h(x, aˆ) = 0,
(λg)Tg(x, aˆ) = 0, λg ≥ 0
(6)
However in this form standard constraint qualifications will always fail due to the value func-
tion as a constraint. To remedy this Ye and Zhu (2010) use the value function constraint as
a penalty and rewrite the problem to
max
x,a
F (x, a) + ξ(f(x, a)− ϕ(x))
s.t. G(x, a) ≥ 0, H(x, a) = 0
∇aˆL(x, aˆ, λg, λh) = 0,
g(x, aˆ) ≥ 0, h(x, aˆ) = 0,
(λg)Tg(x, aˆ) = 0, λg ≥ 0
(7)
Where ξ > 0 is a penalty parameter.
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In general the value function ϕ(x) is unknown to us. However for any given x the agent’s
optimization problem is often easily solved. Therefore we propose to replace the true value
function with a precomputed approximation where we use a function approximator. This
means that we need to approximate a multidimensional function, a seemingly difficult task.
However, there have been many advances in function approximation that make this originally
impossible task tractable. There are two major options we can choose from.
First there are the grid based methods, the most efficient of them being adaptive sparse
grids (Brumm and Scheidegger 2017). They have the advantage that they are well understood
in both theory and practice. Sparse grids perform especially well when used to approximate
Lipschitz continuous functions. The drawback is that we are restricted to a hypercube, i.e.
a set of the form Πni=1[ai, bi]. Fortunatley in many situations we can simply use a box that
contains all possible values of x that we want to plug in.
Second are the grid free methods that are used in Machine Learning, like Gaussian Pro-
cesses (Scheidegger and Bilionis 2019) or Deep Neural Networks (Azinovic, Gaegauf, and
Scheidegger 2019). Their advantage is that we can choose the points at which we approx-
imate our function arbitrarily and therefore we can use them to approximate functions on
any domain. However, they have worse theoretical properties in thus far that where we pick
the sample points significantly influence the quality of our approximation and there are no
theoretical save ways to efficiently pick these points.
Unfortunalty the value function ϕ is non-differentiable in all relevant cases and so we need
to look to non-smooth analysis to study its properties. For this we first need a new notion of
a derivative.
Definition 1. Let f : Rn → R¯ = R ∪ {−∞,∞} be an extended value function, x¯ ∈ Rn and
f(x¯) finite. Then the regular subdifferential of f at x¯ is defined as
∂ˆf(x¯) = {v ∈ Rn|f(x) ≥ f(x¯)+ < v, x− x¯ > +o(‖x− x¯‖)}.
The limiting subdifferential of f at x¯ is
∂f(x¯) = {v ∈ Rn|∃(vk), v = lim
k
vk, vk ∈ ∂ˆf(xk), xk → x¯, f(xk)→ f(x¯)}.
Note when f is convex then the above definitions are equivalent and equal to the subgradient
from convex analysis, i.e.
∂f(x¯) = {v ∈ Rn|f(x) ≥ f(x¯)+ < v, x− x¯ >}.
The good news is that even though ϕ is non-differentiable we can impose conditions under
which the function is Lipschitz continuous. We use the results from Guo, Lin, Ye, and Zhang
(2014) to ensure Lipschitz continuity. They require two conditions.
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Definition 2. We say restricted inf-compactness holds around x if ϕ(x) is finite and there
is a compact set A ⊂ Rna and a ε > 0 such that, for all x with ‖x − x‖ < ε for which
ϕ(x) > ϕ(x)− ε, the agent’s problem (4) has a solution in A.
Note this is a very weak condition and it is trivially satisfied if for all x, Γ(x) ⊂ A for some
compact set A.
Definition 3. A point (x, a) with a ∈ Γ(x) is called quasi-normal if there is no nonzero vector
(λg, λh) such that
0 = ∇g(x¯, a¯)Tλg +∇h(x¯, a¯)Tλh, λg ≥ 0
and there exists (xk, ak)→ (x¯, a¯) such that










This is a weaker version of the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification and there-
fore is easily satisfied.
Theorem 1. (Guo, Lin, Ye, and Zhang 2014, Cor. 4.8) Let S(x¯) denote the optimal solution
mapping for the agent’s problem (4). If restricted inf-compactness holds around x¯ and for each
a¯ ∈ S(x¯), (x¯, a¯) is quasi-normal, then the value function ϕ(x) is Lipschitz continuous around
x¯. Furthermore the limiting subdifferential of ϕ satisfies





{∇xf(x¯, a¯) +∇xg(x¯, a¯)Tλg +∇xh(x¯, a¯)Tλh : (λg, λh) ∈M(x¯, a¯)}
where M(x¯, a¯) is the set of quasi-normal multipliers defined as
M(x¯, a¯) :=

0 = ∇af(x¯, a¯) +∇ag(x¯, a¯)Tλg +∇ah(x¯, a¯)Tλh, λg ≥ 0(
λg, λh
) | there exists (xk, ak)→ (x¯, a¯) such that











Lastly if W˜ (x¯) = {ζ} is a singleton then ϕ(x) is strictly differentiable with ∇ϕ(x) = ζ.
3 Classical static examples
To show the viability of our approach we compute the solution to two examples from the
literature where it is known that the first-order approach fails.
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− (x− 2)2 − (y − 1)2











− (x− 2)2 − (y − 1)2
s.t. − 2e−(−1+y)2(−1 + y)− 2e−(1+y)2x(1 + y) + λg1 − λg2 = 0
λg1(2 + y) = 0
λg2(2− y) = 0
− 2 ≤ y ≤ 2
(9)
We use SNOPT (Gill, Murray, and Saunders 2005) to solve the optimization problem and
find the local solution (1.991209, 0.8947100). Next we approximate the value function with an
adaptive sparse grid with 315 points and resolve the problem with the value function approach
(7). We find the solution (0.9985342, 0.9575735) which is close to the true solution.
Next we look at the example from Araujo and Moreira (2001).
max
x1,x2,y
(1− y3)(1− x1) + y3(5− x2)
s.t. y ∈ arg max
y˜∈[0,0.9]
(1− y3)(√x1 − y2) + y3(√x2 − y2)
(10)




(1− y3)(1− x1) + y3(5− x2)
s.t. − 3y2 (√x1 − y2)+ 3y2 (√x2 − y2)− 2y4 − 2 (1− y3) y + λg1 − λg2 = 0
λg1y = 0
λg2(0.9− y) = 0
0 ≤ y ≤ 0.9
(11)
Without the value function we get the stationary point (0, 0.5489, 0.9), which is not a feasible
solution to the original problem. We approximate the agent’s valuefunction with a grid with
258 points and get the solution (0.0, 1.236787, 0.9).
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